Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future, since inspections can be influenced by firms' past performance relative to other competitors in the market. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing the externality, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-cost firms to mimic low-cost firms, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We show that under certain circumstances, the ongoing signaling game between firm types might reduce socially harmful activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assume that a new regulation for limiting a negative externality arising from production, such as health damages, noise levels, worker safety, biodiversity loss or environmental pollution, is put into place. When the inspection agency responsible for the compliance of the law and the regulated firms meet for the first time, the agency is obviously less informed than the firms about their specific characteristics. However, the agency can collect information on firms' types by performing audits and measuring externality levels. Once the agency has monitored a fraction of firms and has observed their compliance status, it can learn something about the type of firms it is dealing with.
Then, the agency's monitoring strategy in the following period is determined not only by the firms' past compliance status, but also by their performance relative to other competitors in the market. This relative performance acts as a signal of the firms' types, since a firm that is less successful than its peers in reducing its harmful effect on society faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period.
In this paper, we claim that firms' behavior with respect to the regulation depends not only on their externality control costs and the regulatory stringency, but also on the interaction between firms' relative externality levels and future regulations. We show that firms with higher control costs are tempted to choose sufficiently low levels of the externality (i.e., mimic low-cost firms), in order to face laxer enforcement in the next period. But, at the same time, we find that low-cost firms might be interested in signaling their true type, trying to prevent being mimicked by high-cost firms. As a result, actual external costs might be considerably lower than those expected in a static regulatory process. In fact, this process may even lead firms to do better than legally required, i.e. they might over-comply with the regulation. 1 Since imitation is costly for the imitator and the low-cost firms might try to prevent imitation, we find that pooling of firms' decisions only takes place under specific circumstances, which depend on the agency's budget, the number of firms in the industry, the monitoring costs and the minimal amount of the externality needed for the firms to stay in business. In fact, we show that the only possible pooling equilibrium is such that all firms choose the lowest possible level of the externality. When the costs associated with the pooling equilibrium are prohibitively high, a separating equilibrium is attained in which the low-cost firms reduce the externality just enough to avoid imitation by high-cost firms.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the described signaling game that we propose has not yet been used to explain how low enforcement efforts and high compliance rates coexist in reality, a phenomenon known in the literature as the "Harrington paradox", see Nyborg and Telle (2006) for an overview. This paradox challenges the traditional theoretical prediction by Becker (1968) of widespread non-compliance among firms if expected sanctions are small. However, Becker (1968) 's framework is static. If we instead allow for a dynamic interaction between the inspection agency and the firms in the industry, the agency obtains information over time about the regulated firms through signals and can use this information to define its monitoring strategy in the future. Forward looking firms, knowing how their behavior will affect their future regulatory environment, will take this into consideration and may choose lower externality levels than those expected in a static context. 1 According to Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) , the fear of stricter future regulations is indeed one of the reasons that may lead firms to over-comply with existing regulations.
The closest paper to ours is Harrington (1988) , who, based on previous results by Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) and Greenberg (1984) , investigates the relationship between firms' compliance costs and the average level of compliance when both enforcement budgets and maximum penalties are limited. Harrington (1988) also considers a dynamic setting, where enforcement can be made more efficient by dividing firms into groups contingent on each firms' past performance, and then subject the recent violators to a stricter monitoring and sanctioning policy than the others. There are, however, two crucial differences between our work and Harrington (1998 )'s. First, Harrington (1988 does not consider the signaling game we propose. The reason is that Harrington (1988) treats inspected compliant firms and non-inspected firms identically and, therefore, assumes that the agency does not use all the available information efficiently. As a result, firms cannot gain by "mimicking -avoiding being mimicked" because they cannot affect their future regulatory framework. Second, in our model, firms know that their compliance decisions will influence the inspection probabilities in the next period. By contrast, Harrington (1988) does not include this interaction effect and imposes constant inspection probabilities over time.
The main difference of our model versus the traditional models on signaling, such as Spence (1973) , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Grossman (1981) , is that in ours several firms emit simultaneous signals that can be used by the regulator to update its information about the firms and set the regulatory strategy in the subsequent period, as opposed to the case of a single firm emitting a single signal. 2 In our model, the combination of multiple signals allows the regulator to revise its information about the regulated firms. Obviously, if all audited firms send the same signal, the regulatory 2 Signaling games have been previously used in a monitoring and enforcement setting by Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Sobel (1989) . These studies model settlement and prosecution decisions and show that plaintiffs with a strong case demand relatively higher payments in order to settle out of court. agency gets no useful information out of its inspection activities. Also, in our setting, firms cannot opt out on inspections. The regulation on externality control is mandatory and any firm can potentially be monitored by the agency. Thus the firms cannot choose not to participate in the game and they always have to send a signal.
The mimicking behavior in our context is somehow related to avoidance behavior.
Firms have numerous options to avoid apprehension and prosecution (Innes, 2005) : they can flee the scene, they can lobby politicians to relax enforcement activities, or they can distance themselves from a violation by using legal means. Malik (1990) shows that one implication of incorporating avoidance behavior is that penalties need not always be set as high as possible. An important strand of literature dealing with avoidance activities is the tax evasion literature, see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for an overview. However, key to the definition of avoidance is the assumption that avoidance is socially detrimental. Interestingly, this is not the case here. If high-cost firms pretend to be lowcost firms, they reduce the level of the negative externality more than they would otherwise do. Under certain circumstances, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might reduce the socially harmful effects of production.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
In section 3, we analyze the benchmark one-period model. In section 4, we deal with the two-period model. In section 5 we study the likelihood of each possible type of equilibrium, depending on the parameters of the model. We conclude in section 6. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
We consider an industry composed of N firms that face a negative production externality (such as discharges of hazardous substances, smog precursors or noise). The externality level of firm i is denoted as
where 0 e ≥ is the lowest possible level of the externality associated with implementing the best available technology (or the absolute minimal level required for the firms to continue to do business) and o ( ) H θ and low-cost firms ( ) L θ . Also, we assume that the number of high-cost (low-cost)
We assume that there is a regulation in place, which imposes a uniform externality limit or a standard ( ) e e > on the firms. The stringency of the standard and the associated fine, in case a firm is discovered exceeding the standard, are determined by law. For simplicity, the fine F is assumed to be linear: 4 3 Our assumptions ensure that the single-crossing property holds. This implies that high-cost firms find reducing the externality more costly than low-cost firms. 4 In practice, a linear specification of fines is often encountered for civil fines, since this structure is easy to understand by firms, citizens and administrations. For example, the EPA's Clean Air Act Stationary
Further there exists a regulatory agency whose job it is to minimize total external costs caused by the industry, using the regulation in place. This agency has a budget 0 B > per period (say, per year) to spend on monitoring. We assume that the cost per inspection is 0 m > and that monitoring is perfectly accurate. We denote by ti p the probability that firm i is inspected in period t, such that 0 1 ti p ≤ ≤ . Also, let ti e be the externality level selected by firm i in period t . For later use, we also define the total costs ( ) For simplicity we assume that first a law announces the standard and the fine, and this announcement is followed by two regulatory periods. In each period, the regulatory agency announces the probability of inspection and then each firm reacts by choosing the level of the externality. Once the agency has observed the behavior of the inspected firms, it can update its information about the firms in the next regulatory period. The chronology of decisions is represented in figure 1.
Figure 1: Chronology of decisions
Source Civil Penalty Policy (1991) describes the civil fines for violating air pollution standards as "$5000 for each 30% or fraction of 30% increment above the standard".
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Period 2 Period 1 While firms are fully informed about their type (and the types of their partners in the industry), the inspection agency, however, is not 5 . In the first period, the agency is unfamiliar with the regulated firms and it does not have any information on the type of each specific firm. The agency only knows the number of firms of each type in the industry (that is, the distribution of the types). Therefore, initially, the prior probability (or belief) that the agency assigns to the firms to be of the high-cost type is
Therefore, the best the agency can do in the first regulatory period is to inspect all the firms with the same frequency, 1
We assume that actual externality levels are accurately determined by inspections.
Therefore, the agency can update its beliefs, after inspections in the first period have taken place. If 1i e is the externality level (signal) of the inspected firm i in period 1, we denote the agency's ex-post belief that an inspected firm i is of the high-cost type as That is, if all the inspected firms emit the same signal, the inspection agency cannot update its information (that is, it cannot learn). Therefore, in the second period, the agency will continue to use a uniform inspection frequency, 2 2 2 H L p p p = = , such that 2 1 p p = . However, if the inspected firms in period 1 were found to have chosen different externality levels, the agency updates its beliefs: it assigns probability one of being the high-cost type to the firms with the largest 5 Our results are preserved as long as firms have a better (though not necessarily perfect) knowledge about their specific control costs than the agency. externality level, and it also update its beliefs about the non-inspected firms according If inspected firms perform differently in the first stage, the agency is confronted with three groups of firms in period 2: known high-cost firms, known low-cost firms and firms the agency knows nothing about. The agency can therefore decide to differentiate its inspection strategy and treat each group differently, inspecting with probabilities 2H p , 2 L p and 2 N p , respectively.
Regarding payoffs, firms choose externality levels that minimize discounted expected costs, composed of control costs and expected fines for non-compliance in each period, where the second period payoff depends on whether the firm was inspected or not in the first period. These discounted expected costs are the following:
On the other hand, the agency aims to minimize total external costs in the industry, subject to its financial constraint in each period. The total level of the externality is: 
where 2iI e is the externality level chosen by a firm of type , i H L = in the second period if it was inspected in the first period, and 2iN e is the level selected in the second period in case it was not inspected in the first period. The parameter 0 1 e δ ≤ ≤ represents the weight the agency gives to future external costs compared to current externality levels, and can thus be thought of as an externality discount rate.
The relevant equilibrium concept to solve this dynamic game with incomplete information is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a) . In this equilibrium, the strategies of the players are optimal for given beliefs and strategies of the other players, and beliefs on the equilibrium path are updated from observed actions according to Bayes' rule, while beliefs off the equilibrium path are updated according to Bayes' rule where possible.
As a reference case, in the next section we consider the one-period model, under both the situations of complete and asymmetric information.
III. ONE-PERIOD REGULATION
After the standard e and the fine f are made public knowledge, the agency announces an inspection probability i p for each firm i, which afterwards responds with an externality level i e . 6 We solve the problem backwards, and first study the optimal behavior of the firms.
Firms' behavior

Given { }
, , i e f p , firm i solves the following problem: 
The intuition of this result is straightforward. Given the policy { } , , , i e f p the firm can decide to either comply with the standard, or not. The optimal strategy is to comply when the marginal expected penalty for non-compliance is larger than the marginal control costs savings of exceeding the standard; that is, when
In that case, the optimal strategy is * i e e = . 7 However, the optimal strategy is to exceed the standard if the marginal expected penalty is below the marginal control cost savings at the standard. In that case, the firm will choose the externality level such that marginal control cost savings and marginal expected fines are equal. Therefore, * From lemma 1 we can immediately see that there exists a threshold inspection probability for each type, such that compliance is ensured above that threshold. That minimum probability required is: 7 In the one-period model, the firm never chooses an externality level strictly below the standard: it just increases control costs, but there are no penalty savings. However, this does not longer hold in a multiperiod regulation, as we will see later on. 
which defines the effect on the externality of a marginal increase in the inspection probability; the larger the probability, the lower the externality level. Note that the denominator is 'almost' constant in our model, thus implying that the impact of the inspection frequency on the externality level is 'almost' constant. From (1) sufficiently small, we have that the highcost firms react more than the low-cost firms to an increase in the probability of inspection (in terms of the externality reduction), independently of the externality level.
That is 8 :
For later reference, we define the minimum cost function ( ) ( ) , min , ,
By the envelope theorem, this function is increasing in the probability of inspection.
That is, > . All our results are then reversed: the agency targets known low-cost firms more than known high-cost firms, low-cost firms have incentives to mimic high-cost firms and high-cost firms try to deter imitation. Successful imitation and successful active deterrence of imitation both lead to higher externality levels.
Agency's behavior
The behavior of the agency depends on the information available about the firms. With perfect information, the inspection agency knows the specific type of each firm, and is thus able to differentiate its monitoring strategy depending on the type. Since the agency takes into account the optimal response of the firm, presented in Lemma 1 above, the agency's optimization problem under complete information is the following: 
The first three constraints represent the firms' best responses, as established in Lemma 1. The last condition is the agency's budgetary constraint.
In the following lemma, we present the optimal policy in this case.
Lemma 2. In the one-period game under perfect information, the inspection agency's optimal policy ( ) * * , H L p p is the following: (2), the marginal impact of the inspection probability on the externality levels is larger (in absolute terms) for the high-cost firms than for the low-cost firms. Therefore, it is more efficient (in terms of the global externality reduction) to spend the budget on monitoring the high-cost firms until they are induced to comply, and then use the remaining budget (if any) to monitor the low-cost firms.
Finally, case (iii) is the situation of full non-compliance, since the agency does not have enough means to induce the high-cost firms to comply. Here, the budget is fully allocated to monitor the high-cost firms. As a result, the induced externality levels in this case are * H e e ≥ and * 0 .
L L e e = Summarizing, the inspection agency devotes an extra unit of monitoring resources to the firm type that is more efficient in reducing the externality. Since by our assumptions, this is type θ H , independently on the externality levels, the agency first uses its resources to deter the known high-cost firms and then uses any remaining resources to deter the known low-cost firms. Now assume, by contrast, that the agency does not know the specific type of the firms it is dealing with. Here, the agency only has one possibility: it randomly inspects as many firms as possible within the budget restriction, since there is no rational basis for using a separating strategy. This is trivially stated in the following lemma. . This uniform inspection strategy is clearly inefficient, since, compared to the solution under complete information, the low-cost firms will be inspected too often and the high-cost firms will be insufficiently monitored.
Nevertheless, the agency is not able to improve upon it, since it does not have the necessary information. 9
IV. TWO-PERIOD REGULATION
We now turn to the two-period case illustrated earlier in figure 1. We first look at the behavior of the agency in the second period, once she has updated her information 9 The assumption that expression (1) is "almost" a constant is crucial in obtaining corner solutions (in Lemma 2 above, but also later in Proposition 1). However, we prefer to keep this assumption for expositional purposes, since the spirit of the results does not change under a more general specification of abatement costs, such that the marginal impact of the inspection probability on the externality level varies with the inspection probability. In fact, it is quite intuitive to see what happens under a more realistic case based on the inspections carried on in the first period. Then, in a later stage, we analyze the firms' strategies in the first period and the inspection agency's beliefs that sustain those strategies as part of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Second period
In the second period the inspection agency chooses the inspection probabilities, and then firms respond as in Lemma 1. Therefore, we study the agency's strategy, taking the firms' responses into account. On the one hand, if all the inspected firms in the previous period choose the same amount of the externality (pooling equilibrium), they all face the same inspection probability in the second period, B p mN = , as established in Lemma 3.
On the other hand, if the previous inspections allow the agency to divide the audited firms into high-cost and low-cost firms (separating equilibrium), then it can differentiate its optimal inspection strategy. In this case, the problem faced by the inspection agency in the second period is: 
where 2iI e is the externality level chosen by a firm of type i that was inspected in the first period, and 2iN e is the level selected in case a firm of type i was not inspected.
Therefore, the agency now has perfect information about two types of firms (the highcost and low-costs inspected in the first period), and no information about the exact type of the remaining firms, even though it knows the proportion of each firm type in the group of non-inspected firms.
The agency's optimal strategy in this case combines features of the one-period regulation optimal policy under complete and incomplete information analyzed in the previous section.
From (2), we already know that monitoring resources must be first devoted to known high-cost firms rather than to known low-cost firms, since the marginal impact of the inspection probability on the externality level of the former group is larger (in absolute terms 
Here, the optimal inspection strategy follows the same structure as that of lemma 2.
Therefore, the agency first devotes monitoring resources to the firms that are most effective in reducing external costs (i.e. the firms that were inspected in the first period and that turned out to be type H θ ); if the agency has enough resources to induce compliance in this group, it devotes the money left to the next most effective group (i.e.
the non-inspected firms in the first period); and then, if there is still money left, to the least effective group in reducing the externality problem (i.e. the inspected firms that turned out to be of type L θ ). The optimal inspection strategy is formally presented next. 
First period
As we know from lemma 3, in the first period the agency has no information and cannot do better than to randomly inspect firms:
In this period, the relevant issue is to analyze the behavior of the firms, who realize that their actions have an effect on next period's monitoring. Knowing that inspection probabilities in period 2 will be as in Proposition 1, we can distinguish two types of equilibria: 1) separating equilibria in which both types of firms choose a different externality level and 2) pooling equilibria in which both types of firms select an identical level of the externality. 10
Firstly, in a separating equilibrium, the high-cost firms select an externality level so as to minimize its expected costs:
The low-cost firms equilibrium strategy is to select an externality level 1L e no larger than the one that minimizes its expected costs, * 1 1 . Low-cost firms would have to decrease their externality levels below e to avoid mimicking, but this is not possible since e is the absolute minimum 11 In order to obtain the Riley outcome as a unique equilibrium in a model of two types, we have used the 'intuitive criterion' of Cho and Kreps (1987) , which imposes certain conditions on the agency's out-ofequilibrium beliefs, in the sense that certain types of firms should not be expected to use certain strategies. This means, for example, that for any pair of externality levels chosen by two particular firms, the agency assigns probability zero of being a high-cost type to the firm that selected the lowest externality level. Of course, other strategies can be sustained in equilibrium with other beliefs, but those beliefs might not be reasonable.
amount of the externality required for the firms to continue doing business. Then, it is always profitable for the high-cost firm to imitate the low-cost firms and the low-cost firms will not be able to prevent this. Thus, as Kreps and Sobel (1994) show, pooling is only possible at the lowest possible level of the externality, that is, the amount of the externality associated with implementing the best available technology. Any other pooling strategy is not stable (any firm might be tempted to infinitesimally reduce its own level to pretend to be of the low-cost type). Therefore, the agency's inspections in the first period will not provide the necessary information for differentiating its inspection strategy in the second period. For the reader's convenience, 
V. DISCUSSION
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we compute the total externality levels associated with each type of equilibrium, and select the best equilibrium, in terms of the lowest total externality level induced. Second, we study the likelihood of obtaining each of the two equilibria depending on the parameters of the model. In particular, we analyze the influence of the agency's budget, the number of firms and the monitoring costs on the possibility that firms choose the same or different strategies and, therefore, whether the agency can learn the firms' types in the first period and differentiate its strategy in the second regulatory period.
Impact on total externality levels
The strategies chosen by the firms and the agency will influence the total externality levels, resulting from monitoring and enforcing the standard e . Depending on the case (see table 1), total external costs will differ. As a reference point, we use the case where the agency cannot learn anything from inspecting firms, even if externality levels differ between firms. So, the reference scenario is analogous to playing the static game with imperfect information (see section III) twice. This implies that total discounted externality levels over the two periods equal: Trivially, this shows that learning is always beneficial. In any case, externality levels in a situation where the agency can acquire information through auditing firms will be lower than in the reference scenario, where such learning was non-implementable.
Comparing cases (ia) and (ib), we also find that the threat of mimicking is a good thing, since the low-cost firms will reduce their externality levels more than in the static casethey might even over-comply with the standard -in order to deter high-costs firms from imitating them. So, when firms choose a separating equilibrium in the first period, resulting total external costs over the two periods are lower if mimicking is actively prevented.
Comparing case (ii) with cases (ia) and (ib), we find that successful imitation (that is, the firms are pooled) can reduce total discounted externality levels when the discount rate e δ is sufficiently low and, for case (ia), also if the number of high-cost firms H N is sufficiently high. In fact, externality costs in the first period can be very low, since firms select externality levels below the standard, i.e., they over-comply. By contrast, for a sufficiently high discount rate, pooling and mimicking by firms might worsen the externality problem, since the second period external costs associated with a uniform inspection probability will exceed those resulting from a differentiated inspection policy ( ) 2 E .
Likelihood of each equilibrium
The likelihood of obtaining a particular equilibrium crucially depends on the complete ranking of inspection probabilities, presented in Proposition 2, which is critically affected by the available budget B. Clearly, the larger * We now explore the four cases of Proposition 2, to see under which possibility we have the largest incentives for mimicking (by the high-cost firms) and the largest incentives to deter mimicking (by the low-cost firms). Clearly, on the one hand, imitation is most attractive to the high-cost firms in case (i) of Proposition 2, since in that case * * 2 2 H N H p p p p = = > . We also see that these incentives for mimicking are successively lower under cases (ii), (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2. On the other hand, case (iv) provides the low-cost firms with the largest incentives to avoid mimicking, since * * 2 2 0, L N p p = = and cases (iii), (ii) and (i) provide successively lower incentives to deter imitation.
Since case (i) of Proposition 2 provides the largest likelihood of mimicking and the lowest likelihood of mimicking deterrence, this case then provides the largest likelihood of pooling behavior among firms in the first period. So, interestingly, pooling behavior is more likely under a large inspection budget.
We are now able to comment on the influence of the available budget, the number of firms in the industry and the level of the monitoring costs on the motivation for mimicking. As we have already shown, an increase in the available budget, ceteris paribus, provides more incentives for imitation. Indeed, a higher budget implies more inspections in any scenario. Thus the benefits from mimicking increase, since they depend, amongst other things, on the likelihood p of being inspected in the first period.
The more likely it is that a high-cost firm can be detected in the first period, the more it stands to gain from hiding among the low-cost firms. For this reason, we also make the following two observations. Firstly, the lower the number of firms affected by the regulation, the higher the incentives for pooling, ceteris paribus. Secondly, if inspections become less expensive, ceteris paribus, high-cost firms will be induced mimic low-cost firms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that incorporating learning in regulatory enforcement has implications for the agency and the firms' strategies, as well as for total external costs. We assume that the regulatory agency has the possibility to learn about the true types of the firms it is confronted with through inspection, but only if it finds subgroups of firms performing differently. This type of learning is used afterwards to target known types in the subsequent regulatory period. Since the agency has a fixed enforcement budget (which sometimes can be quite small), we show that it will devote more enforcement resources in the next period to auditing the known high-cost firms (whose reactions to a change in the inspection probability are larger). Only if the agency can successfully induce compliance of the known high-cost firms and it has money left, will it devote effort (resources) to try to improve compliance in the next group, i.e. those firms that where not inspected in the first period. Money left (if any) will then be devoted to the leastefficient group, i.e. the known low-cost firms.
In principle, this targeting strategy can be detrimental for high-cost firms but beneficial for low-cost firms. Therefore, high-cost firms may have an incentive to avoid this situation by trying to mimic the low-cost firms; although low-cost firms may try to avoid being mimicked.
We show that the likelihood of a pooling equilibrium (that is, one in which high-cost firms successfully mimic low-cost firms) depends positively on the agency's budgetary constraint, and negatively on the number of firms in the industry and the monitoring costs. These three factors crucially determine the probability of being inspected in the first period; the larger this probability, the more prone the agency is to target high (low)-cost firms with larger (lower) inspection frequencies in the next period. Also, note that stimulating the dispersion of available technologies, e.g. by subsidizing best available technologies, makes externality reductions cheaper and thus pooling behavior more attractive.
To prevent mimicking, our results suggest that the agency should not be given a large budget. But interestingly, if the agency significantly discounts future externality reductions and thus focuses on present gains and if the proportion of high-costs firms in the industry is sufficiently large, mimicking, or even the threat of mimicking, might be good for society. These social benefits arise when we compare the externality levels with the separating equilibrium where high-cost firms do not imitate low-cost firms, because it is just not profitable for them to do so (even if low-cost types do not actively avoid being copied). In any case, this avoidance behavior results in a lower amount of global external costs in the first period. On the one hand, the high-cost types may try to reduce the externality in the first period to avoid future tighter monitoring. On the other hand, the low-cost types may try to reduce the externality as well, in order to differentiate themselves from the high-cost types and thus prevent being pooled.
Sometimes they might even avoid being imitated by doing better than the standard in the first period (i.e. by over-complying).
Several extensions of our model are possible. For example, we have assumed that inspections are accurate, that is, there are no measurement errors. However, in reality, it is sometimes the case that a high-cost firm is wrongly thought to be a low-cost firm (false positives). This then implies that the information obtained by the agency from the first period is less valuable than with perfect inspections, and therefore benefits from mimicking are reduced.
Interestingly, pooling is not the likely outcome when the regulatory time horizon is sufficiently large. There would be many periods with imitation costs for the high-cost firms, while the benefit of mimicking would only be reached asymptotically (in the 'last' period). This observation also implies that a reversal in strategy (from pooling to separating or from separating to pooling) is never optimal either. Thus, in an infinitely repeated game, the agency is always able to learn the firms' true type through inspections, since high-cost firms never pose as low-cost firms. Finally, the infinitely repeated game converges to a steady-state equilibrium, which involves a cost efficient allocation of the available funds. This implies that the agency's resources are used where they cause the greatest reduction in the level of the externality. As a result, it might be optimal for the agency to exclusively target one group of firms and to completely ignore the other firms, if the available budget is sufficiently small. Following a similar reasoning as that of case (ii), we obtain the condition 
